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 Transformative Constitutionalism in South 
Africa: Creative Uses of Constitutional Court 
Authority to Advance Substantive Justice 
Eric C. Christiansen* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Substantive justice is an ever-elusive goal for constitution-makers. A 
desire to structure a system of government and draft rights protections that 
will advance genuine justice for their people is almost always an aspiration 
claimed by nation-builders. But it is a goal that is typically met imperfectly, 
if not inadequately. Nevertheless, seeking justice that is superior to that of 
the previous regime motivates many countries to reformulate their 
government or change their laws, or even to amend or rewrite their 
constitutions. And any such quest for justice is made much more 
challenging if the country aspires to actualize substantive justice: justice in 
its fuller dimensions as demonstrated by more than formal, legal equality or 
the exclusive protection of negative liberties.1 
For political theorists, workaday advocates, and legal academics who 
seek justice in this richer sense, studying South Africa is a natural area of 
inquiry. Since the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, the Republic of South 
Africa has attempted an intentional process of remaking itself as a ―human 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, San Francisco, California; J.D., New York University School of Law, 2001; M.A., University 
of Chicago, 1995. This Article is an expanded version of my presentation at the Conference on 
Conceptualizing Substantive Justice held at University of Denver Sturm College of Law in April 
2009; my thanks to the organizer Nancy Ehrenreich and the many participants. In writing this 
Article, I also benefited from helpful comments from my colleagues, Professors Chester Chuang, 
Michele Benedetto Neitz, and Rachel Van Cleave, and received very valuable aid from my research 
assistants Erik Knuppel and Vanessa Sundin.  Of note, this Article‘s reflections upon and assertions 
regarding the South African Constitutional Court are drawn in part from my personal experience 
working in South Africa as a foreign law clerk to the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Arthur 
Chaskalson.  The opinions expressed herein (and any errors) are the author‘s own. 
 1. My use of the term ―negative liberties‖ here (and later) refers to the traditional civil and 
political rights conceived of specifically (and for my purposes, merely) as an individual‘s right to be 
free from government interference. This is a distinction made in U.S. constitutional law most 
notably in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203–04 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (―The 
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require 
the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining 
law and order.‖). 
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rights state.‖2 Indeed, South Africa is the most frequently discussed example 
of this form of transformative constitutionalism: a conscious attempt to 
create a nation that would espouse and accomplish substantive justice in its 
political and economic facets. South Africa‘s 1996 Constitution declared the 
new nation to be ―a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights . . . .‖ with the express mission to ―[i]mprove the 
quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person.‖3 South 
Africa has been attempting to transform itself through a constitution that 
zealously protects traditional civil and political rights and addresses the 
more fundamental elements of justice as well. Indeed, South Africa has 
established a jurisprudence of expansive dignity and equality protections as 
well as the only relatively comprehensive, affirmative social rights 
jurisprudence of any nation4—a reflection of the transformative values of 
the Constitution and the South African Constitutional Court‘s commitment 
to the nation‘s justice-oriented ideology.  
In late 2009, the Constitutional Court went through a symbolic but 
significant change. The Court acquired its third Chief Justice and lost the 
last sitting members of the first generation of Constitutional Court justices, 
as those judges appointed by President Mandela in the months after South 
Africa‘s first democratic elections retired due to judicial term limits.5 This 
occasion provides many commentators an opportunity to evaluate the work 
of the Court‘s first fifteen years.6 The conclusion of many critics will 
inevitably be that, while the Court (like the South African government 
generally) has been responsible for significant social and political progress, 
 
 2. Makua wa Mutua, Hope and Despair For a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights 
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997); see also, Nelson Mandela, Speech at the Signing 
of the Constitution (Dec. 10, 1996), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/ 
1996/sp961210.html (―Let us give practical recognition to the injustices of the past, by building a 
future based on equality and social justice.‖). 
 3. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 (discussing the goals of the Constitution in the preamble). 
 4. See generally Eric. C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-economic 
Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007) 
(explaining the historical development of social welfare rights jurisprudence through the process of 
―differentiated incorporation‖). Although they are not the direct focus of this article, social welfare 
rights are unquestionably an element of substantive justice.  
 5. Zuma Welcomes Four New Judges, PRETORIA NEWS (S. Afr.), Oct. 12, 2009, at 2, 
available at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20091012040423 
967C691607. Newly appointed justices hold office for non-renewable terms of 12 years or until the 
judge attains the age of 70, except where an Act of Parliament extends a term. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 
ch. 8, § 176(1) (as amended by Act No. 34 of 2001 s. 15). 
 6. The South African Constitutional Court was created under the Interim Constitution. S. 
AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, ch. 7, § 98(1); repealed and replaced by the S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, 
§ 176. Following the appointment of the justices, the Court was formally opened by President 
Mandela on February 14, 1995. ConstitutionalCourt.org.za, History of the Court of South Africa, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
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it has had only modest impact on the seemingly intractable problems of 
socio-economic injustice and substantive inequality.  
However, for those critics—and I include myself among them—
particularly interested in the Constitutional Court‘s ability to advance 
substantive justice, recent cases indicate the Court may be adding a new 
dimension to its experiment in transformative constitutionalism. In three 
relatively new judgments, the Court appears to be more creatively using 
certain elements of its institutional authority to promote genuine justice. If 
this assessment is correct, this would be another praiseworthy contribution 
of the South African Constitutional Court to the field of comparative 
constitutionalism and an additional way to promote its transformative 
agenda.  
South Africa has already demonstrated the justiciability of enumerated 
social welfare rights and that the South African model of social welfare 
adjudication—one critical element of substantive justice—could be 
borrowed by other national courts.7 But these most recent developments, if 
they continue to be evidenced in future generations of the Court, are more 
easily exported to other nations because they do not require specific textual 
language (e.g., enumerated socio-economic rights) in the adopting nation‘s 
constitution. Rather, they demonstrate how purposive interpretation and 
creative application of a court‘s jurisdiction and remedial authority can 
advance justice. If this trend continues, it will highlight an additional 
opportunity for other nations to advance their own goals of genuine political 
and socio-economic justice.  
In this Article, I will first discuss some easily overlooked constitutional 
tools for promoting greater social justice: the procedural provisions of the 
South African Constitution related to jurisdiction, access, remedies and 
constitutional interpretation. Following that, I will use three recent 
Constitutional Court cases to demonstrate the Court‘s creative (and 
promising) use of its judicial authority to advance substantive justice. By 
way of conclusion, I will elaborate on the meaning of these recent 
developments for the transformative agenda of South Africa and for other 
nations. 
 
 7. See generally Eric C. Christiansen, Exporting South Africa’s Social Rights Jurisprudence, 
5 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 29 (2007) (advocating the possibility of other countries adopting the 
South African model); Eric C. Christiansen, Using Constitutional Adjudication to Remedy Socio-
Economic Injustice: Comparative  Lessons from South Africa, 13 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
369 (2008) (exploring South Africa‘s experience in using a constitution to enhance and protect 
social welfare). 
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II. THE PROCEDURAL AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETIVE MANDATE OF A 
TRANSFORMATIVE COURT 
Comparative constitutional law scholars look first to a constitution‘s 
rights provisions when they wish to assess the capacity of a constitution to 
advance justice. However, while this Article will discuss elements of the 
South African Bill of Rights, the initial focus is on a less likely set of 
provisions: the grant of jurisdiction to the courts, the provisions regarding 
access to courts for parties, the remedial powers of the South African 
judiciary, and the textual instructions related to the judicial tasks of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation. Understanding these provisions will help 
explain the expansive capacity of the South African Constitutional Court to 
advance substantive justice from a multitude of textual bases.  
A. The Constitutional Court in South Africa’s Transition 
From the ―talks about talks about talks‖ in 1989 to the effective date of 
the current constitution in 1997, the process of bringing constitutional 
democracy to South Africa was resolved through a negotiation process 
dominated by the generally opposed concerns of the ruling, white-minority 
National Party and the African National Congress.8 Despite imperfections in 
the drafting process and in the resulting document, the negotiations 
achieved a goal considered impossible for decades: a relatively peaceful 
shift from ―racial autocracy to a non-racial democracy, by means of a 
negotiated transition, the progressive implementation of democracy, and 
respect for fundamental human rights.‖9  
The fundamental compromise that permitted agreement between the 
previously combative parties was a temporary governing arrangement to 
facilitate democratic elections and end apartheid.10 This agreement, the 
Interim Constitution, also contained a set of thirty-four mandatory principles 
(the aptly named, ―Thirty-four Principles‖) that the negotiating parties 
agreed would govern the terms of the final Constitution to be drafted by a 
newly elected Constitutional Assembly.11 The Constitutional Court was 
 
 8. See generally ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF SOUTH AFRICA‘S ROAD TO CHANGE (1995); PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE 
END OF APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997) (both books providing 
general histories of the political transformation of South Africa at the end of the apartheid era). 
 9.  Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 
695, 695 (1996). 
 10. Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:  In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at ch. 1, para. 10–13 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter In re 
Certification of the Constitution]. 
 11. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, sched. 4. 
Reprinted with permission from The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. 
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created by the Interim Constitution and was assigned the task of certifying 
that the final Constitution conformed to the negotiated agreement 
memorialized in the transitional document.12  
The Thirty-four Principles established ―the fundamental guidelines, the 
prescribed boundaries, according to which and within which the 
[Constitutional Assembly] was obliged to perform its drafting function.‖13 
The final Constitution was not ―certified‖ and hence not valid until the 
elected Constitutional Assembly could secure a Constitutional Court ruling 
to that effect.14 In fact, the first proposed draft was rejected on several 
grounds and had to be amended by the Constitutional Assembly in line with 
the Court‘s opinion.15 The amended text of the Constitution was approved 
by the Constitutional Court on December 4, 1996, and formally took effect 
on February 4, 1997.16 Hence, the Court played a decisive role in assuring 
the success of the negotiated transition to democracy, and it significantly 
influenced the final text of the Constitution. 
The exceptional role played by the Court in the drafting process was 
not the only novel thing about the South African Constitutional Court. The 
Interim Constitution ended the era of parliamentary supremacy in South 
Africa and invested very broad judicial review authority in the courts of 
South Africa—including the power to review proposed legislation, national 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. In re Certification of the Constitution, supra note 10, at ch. 2, para. 32. 
 14. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, ch. 5, § 71(2) (―The new constitutional text passed by the 
Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, shall not be of any force and effect unless the 
Constitutional Court has certified that all the provisions of such text comply with the Constitutional 
Principles referred to in subsection (1)(a).‖). ―It is necessary to underscore again that the basic 
certification exercise involves measuring the [final constitutional text] against the [Thirty-four 
Principles].‖ In re Certification of the Constitution, supra note 10, at ch. 2, para. 32. 
 15. While acknowledging that the drafting marked a ―monumental achievement‖ and that ―in 
general and in the majority of its provisions‖ the Constitutional Assembly had succeeded, the Court 
stated ―we ultimately come to the conclusion that the [proposed Constitution] cannot be certified 
because there are several respects in which there has been noncompliance‖ with the Thirty-four 
Principles. The Court returned the text to the Constitutional Assembly for revisions consistent with 
its ruling. Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended 
Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) at para. 31 (S. 
Afr.) [hereinafter In re Certification of the Amended Text]. 
Justice Albie Sachs later identified this decision as a ―unique jurisprudential and political event in 
the world,‖ whereby the Constitutional Court declared the South African Constitution to be 
―unconstitutional.‖ Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa’s Constitution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
669, 669 (1996). 
 16. In re Certification of the Amended Text, supra note 15, at para. 205 (S. Afr.). The 
amended text was completed on October 11, 1996, and approved by the Constitutional Court on 
December 4, 1996. Suzanne Daley, South African Constitution is Approved by High Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A11. On December 10, 1996, the new Constitution was signed by President 
Mandela. Hugh Dellios, S. Africa Tries out New System with Risky Plan, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1996, 
at 1. It formally took effect on February 4, 1997. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
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and provincial statutes, provincial constitutions, acts of the executive branch 
and administrative bodies, and decisions of lower courts on all matters 
related to the Constitution.17 For the most dramatic form of judicial review, 
invalidating laws passed by Parliament and the provincial assemblies, the 
Constitutional Court has a mandatory form of final review authority over all 
other courts.18 
The inauguration of judicial review in 1993 was a significant change 
for South Africa. Apartheid in South Africa had been a parliamentary 
sovereignty system, vesting ultimate governmental authority in the national 
Parliament and not subjecting its laws to invalidation by the courts.19 
Moreover, the onset of judicial review was not merely an experiment with a 
new constitutional model; judicial review played an essential role in 
facilitating the transformation from apartheid oppression to constitutional 
democracy. 
A transition of the caliber and consequence of South Africa‘s could 
easily cripple a legal system. Doing away with all existing laws or sitting 
judges, or casting doubt upon their applicability or authority, would add 
uncertainty to an already tumultuous period. Hence, necessary allowances 
were included among the transitional provisions of both the Interim 
Constitution and the 1996 Constitution to leave laws, regulations, judges 
and civil servants in place. 
All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, 
continues in force, subject to . . . any amendment or repeal; 
and . . . consistency with the new Constitution.20 
Old order legislation that continues in force . . . continues to be 
administered by the authorities that administered it when the new 
Constitution took effect . . . .21  
Every court, including courts of traditional leaders, existing when 
the new Constitution took effect, continues to function and to 
exercise jurisdiction in terms of the legislation applicable to it, and 
anyone holding office as a judicial officer continues to hold office 
 
 17. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167. 
 18. Id. § 172(2)(a) (―The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status 
may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act 
or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court.‖). 
 19. See generally J.D. van der Vyver, Depriving Westminster of Its Moral Constraints: A 
Survey of Constitutional Development in South Africa, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291 (1985) 
(contrasting South Africa‘s 1984 apartheid constitution with the British style of government that 
preceded it). 
 20. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, sched. 6(2)(1)(a–b). 
 21. Id. (2)(2)(b). 
Reprinted with permission from The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. 
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in terms of the legislation applicable to that office . . . .22 
The Constitutional Court was positioned atop the preexisting legal 
system and empowered to oversee, guide, and correct holdover judges and 
judicial administrators in the application of the new rights in the starkly 
reformed, justice-oriented legal system. By creating a new, capstone judicial 
body, one untarnished by an apartheid history, South Africa was able to 
enjoy the ongoing benefits of an established legal system without sacrificing 
its transformative goals of equality, dignity, and justice.23 
At the conclusion of the constitutional transition, the South African 
Constitutional Court was the branch of government that was undeniably the 
first among equals. The Court was uniquely empowered by its role to ensure 
the initial democratic transition and as the ultimate interpreter of the new 
Constitution through judicial review due to its placement at the pinnacle of a 
court system newly empowered by a transformational value set.  
The Court‘s expansive power to advance substantive justice comes 
from institutional characteristics as much as from the generous enumeration 
of political and social rights. As discussed below, the Court has very broad 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters and has far-reaching, discretionary 
remedial powers. Additionally, access to the Court is multi-form and 
generally permissive. These procedural characteristics form a critical aspect 
of the power and authority of the judiciary and the Court. In some ways 
these qualities were necessary for a transition like South Africa‘s, but they 
also reflect the conscious vesting of authority in the Constitutional Court. 
B. Characteristics of the Constitutional Court’s Procedural Authority 
 Consistent with the Constitution and the Constitutional Court‘s use 
of plain language, the procedural authority of the Court can be thought of as 
the who, how, and what of constitutional justiciability in South Africa. The 
―who‖ issue concerns the persons who may bring a claim in the South 
African courts. The ―how‖ issue focuses on the procedural elements of 
access: getting heard at the Constitutional Court by means of direct access, 
direct appeal, or through the standard means of traditional appellate review. 
The ―what‖ issue focuses on the classic issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction—always an important issue for a court of limited jurisdiction 
like the Constitutional Court.  
 
 22. Id. (16)(1).  
 23. ConstitutionalCourt.org.za, supra note 6. 
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1. Access to the Court: Who and How 
The central role of the Court is to oversee the interpretation of the 
Constitution by lower courts and review the constitutionality of the acts of 
the other governmental bodies and state actors.24 This purpose is supported 
by open access to the court system and broad capacity of the Constitutional 
Court to decide particular issues. Generally speaking, as explained below, 
standing rules for plaintiffs, i.e., access generally to the court system, as 
well as the specific rules of access to the Constitutional Court itself, are 
discretionary and permissive.  
a. Standing: Who may bring a claim? 
Access for plaintiffs is clearly spelled out in the Constitution. It 
includes the following very broad standing clause: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent 
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed 
or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including 
a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court 
are—  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in 
their own name;  
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or 
class of persons;  
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.25 
The constitutional grant of access for such plaintiffs extends well 
beyond the commonly-included classes of persons with immediate 
remediable harms, thus offering unquestionably greater access than most 
courts.26 These standing provisions seem to anticipate the practical 
difficulties for many potential plaintiffs. The express allowance of access 
for ―anyone acting . . . in the interest of . . . a group or class of persons‖ or 
―anyone acting in the public interest‖ seems to be an open invitation to 
anyone with resources to advance the interests of those without—a critical 
concern in a nation where issues of poverty, historical discrimination, and 
 
 24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(4). 
 25. Id. ch. 2, § 38. 
 26. E.g., the American standing requirements of injury, causation, redressability, as well as 
the judicially-created elements of standing, drawn from U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
Reprinted with permission from The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. 
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poor education would otherwise inhibit access to the justice system.27 The 
result is that a far greater number of concerns may be brought to the 
attention of South African courts—assisting the Court‘s role as supervisor 
of all governmental action and granting it more opportunities to facilitate 
transformation. 
b. Access: How do claims get to the Constitutional Court? 
Although standing rules for the court system are generally permissive 
and an unusual form of direct access is available to plaintiffs, the 
Constitutional Court is meant primarily to be an appellate body. Three 
forms of appeal can get a case to the Court: (1) ordinary appeals from the 
Supreme Court of Appeal; (2) direct appeals from a High Court (or other 
trial court with particular jurisdiction, e.g., Land Claims Court); and (3) 
appeals against an order of invalidity of Parliamentary or provincial acts or 
the conduct of the President.28 The most common form of appeal, and the 
way in which most cases come before the Constitutional Court, is the 
standard, most recognizable form of appeal: review of a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the highest appellate court for non-constitutional 
issues.29 Such appeals are discretionary for the Court and are determined 
based on consideration of the interests of justice. 30  
Alternatively, the Constitution allows an expedited procedure for 
exceptional cases: a direct appeal permits a party to appeal from the original 
trial court directly to the Constitutional Court. 31 For most disputes, a direct 
appeal merely skips one level of appellate review, the Supreme Court of 
 
 27. Many people in South Africa still live in poverty and disadvantage:  9–10% of adults have 
had no formal education and another 10–11% are ―functionally illiterate.‖ SOUTH AFRICA 
YEARBOOK 2007/08, at 183 (Delien Burger, ed. 2007), available at http://www.gcis.gov.za/ 
resource_centre/sa_info/yearbook/2007-08.htm. Only 14.6% of the population is covered by a 
formal medical aid scheme. Id. at 336. The unemployment rate was 25.6% in 2006. Id. at 138. 
Approximately, 71.14% of households rent housing and approximately 28% of renters in 
metropolitan areas do not live in formal structures. Id. at 351.  
 28. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(5). 
 29. Id. ch. 8, § 168. 
 30. Khumalo & Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at para. 8 (S. Afr.) (―Constitution 
intends that the interests of justice (coupled with leave of this Court) be the determinative criterion 
for deciding when appeals should be entertained by this Court.‖). 
 31. R. CONST. CRT. S. AFR. 19, available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/ 
thecourt/rulesofthecourt.htm. The Constitutional Court employs an ―interests of justice‖ evaluation, 
considering the prospect of success, effect of time and costs for the normal route of appeal, of direct 
applicability of constitutional law, and the desirability of reaching an end to any present legal 
uncertainty. Member of the Executive Council for Development Planning and Local Government, 
Gauteng v Democratic Party 1998 (4) SA 1157 (CC) at para. 16 (S. Afr.), available at http://www. 
saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/9.pdf. 
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Appeal, but it is available from any court.32 However, the Constitutional 
Court denies most applications for direct appeals because they ―deny to this 
Court the advantage of having before it judgments of the [Supreme Court of 
Appeals] on the matters in issue.‖33 Moreover, because of the potential that 
Supreme Court of Appeal adjudication will settle the claims on a non-
constitutional basis, the Court has said, ―Where there are both constitutional 
issues and other issues in the appeal, it will seldom be in the interests of 
justice that the appeal be brought directly to this Court.‖34 
All High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and certain other 
courts have the capacity to ―make an order concerning the constitutional 
validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the 
President,‖ but any such ruling requires Constitutional Court confirmation.35  
A declaration of invalidity is only valid after Court review.36 Such referrals 
account for much of the docket of the Constitutional Court. 
Additionally, ―direct access‖ is an exceptional (and rare) shortcut 
procedure available to plaintiffs with its origin in the Constitution: 
―National legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a 
person, when it is in the interests of justice and with leave of the 
Constitutional Court . . . to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional 
Court . . . .‖37 The ―direct access‖ procedure is a discretionary jurisdictional 
procedure for the Court. In practice, the Court has allowed direct access 
only in very limited circumstances. The Court has exhibited a preference for 
the traditional appellate process as the means through which a case should 
rise to the Court‘s attention.38  
Although direct access (like a direct appeal) is granted only in very 
exceptional circumstances, its availability allows the Constitutional Court 
 
 32. CONST. CT. S. AFR. R. 19(1), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/ 
thecourt/rulesofthecourt.htm.  
 33. Gauteng, 1998 (4) SA at para. 32. 
 34. Id. 
 35. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 172(2)(a) (―The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or 
a court of similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity 
has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.‖). 
 36. Such an order is mandatory and must occur within fifteen days of its declaration. JOHAN 
DE WAAL et al., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK CH. 5.4 (2000). Such a referral is treated 
differently than an appeal or a grant of direct access. Id. The parties to the original action may file 
an appeal of the ruling or apply for confirmation of it. Id. If this happens, the Court will follow the 
normal appellate procedure. Id. 
 37. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(6)(a). 
 38. See generally Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropo. Municipality & Others 2005 (1) 
SA 530 (CC) (S. Afr.) (discussing how direct access is not normally in the interest of justice and 
how other courts‘ views assist the Court in making decisions).  
Reprinted with permission from The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. 
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discretion to expedite a judicial determination when the parties‘ 
circumstances or the requirements of justice warrant it.39 The new 
Constitution‘s legal system has flexibility structured into it for when the 
traditional (and slow) trial or appellate process is insufficient for the 
demands of justice. Of note, the companion case to Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fourie, discussed below, is one such exception.40 Direct access 
was granted because the ―overlap between the issues raised [in the two 
marriage equality cases] and their strong interconnectedness requires them 
to be dealt with in an integrated and comprehensive fashion.‖41 
2. Jurisdiction: What Claims Can Be Adjudicated? 
The 1996 Constitution, like the Interim Constitution before it, envisions 
a highly influential role for the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court ―is the highest court in all constitutional matters,‖42 with such matters 
being defined non-exclusively as ―including any issue involving the 
interpretation, protection, or enforcement of the Constitution.‖43 Its 
authority is limited to ―constitutional matters, and issues connected with 
decisions on constitutional matters,‖ but the Court has exclusive 
competence to decide the jurisdictional appropriateness of any issue before 
 
 39. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(6). 
 40. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Another 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 
39–44 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2005/19.pdf. The companion 
case, joined at the Constitutional Court, was Lesbian and Gay Equality Project & Others v Minister 
of Home Affairs & Others 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/ 
cases/ZACC/2005/20.pdf.  
 41. Fourie 2005 (1) SA at para 42. Other exceptions are discussed in Tsotetsi v Mut. & Fed. 
Ins. Co. 1997 (1) SA 585 (CC) at para. 12 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ 
ZACC/1996/19.pdf (explaining that ―[t]he court has been willing to exercise its discretion to permit 
direct access in several cases: where it was satisfied that there was a pressing need for a particular 
issue to be determined in order to avoid substantial dislocation in the criminal justice process (S v 
Zuma at paragraph 11); or to prevent significant delays and disruption in the procedures relating to 
the liquidation of companies (Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO 
and Others at paragraph 10); where a litigant had no other avenue for relief available (Besserglik v 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism and Others at paragraph 6); where there was a compelling 
national interest in the determination of an issue in the light of a pending election (Executive 
Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others at paragraphs 15 – 17 [sic]) and where parties consented to direct access and there was a real 
prospect that the order made by the court will in fact be decisive for the case (Brink v Kitshoff NO at 
paragraph 18). The grant of direct access remains a discretionary power of the court which will be 
exercised in exceptional circumstances only and in the light of the facts of each particular 
application.‖). 
 42. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167(3). 
 43. Id. (7). 
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it.44  
The South African judiciary is a decentralized system of judicial 
review; multiple layers of courts may review laws, regulations, and state 
and private action against the dictates of the 1996 Constitution. The 
constitutional review authority of the lower South African courts is defined 
as all constitutional matters other than those belonging to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.45 Hence, it is most helpful first to 
review the areas of exclusive jurisdiction: 
Only the Constitutional Court may—  
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or 
provincial sphere concerning [their] constitutional status, powers 
or functions . . . ;  
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or 
provincial Bill [under its abstract review authority46] . . . ;  
(c) decide applications [for declaration of unconstitutionality of 
Parliamentary or provincial acts] . . . ;  
(d) decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the 
Constitution;  
(e) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a 
constitutional obligation; or  
(f) certify a provincial constitution . . . .47 
Hence, the Court is granted all of the varieties of jurisdiction—original 
jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, and abstract review authority—rather 
than some smaller set as is typical in most other legal systems. For matters 
of exclusive jurisdiction, the Court will be the venue of original and final 
review. All other matters, including the majority of constitutional validity 
claims, will typically be heard by other courts and reach the Constitutional 
Court only on appeal or by direct referral from the lower court.   
3. Remedial Powers 
Like the laws regarding standing and access to the courts and its 
jurisdictional grant, the remedial powers of the Constitutional Court (and 
the South African courts generally) are very broad—both in initial grant and 
in their interpretation by the Court itself. Section 172 of the Constitution 
states: 
 
 44. Id. (3). 
 45. Id. §§ 169–70. 
 46. Id. ch. 4, §§ 79–80, 121–22. 
 47. Id. ch. 8, § 167(4). 
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When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court—  
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and  
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including -  
 (i)  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of 
 invalidity; and  
  (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any 
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to 
correct the defect.48 
These provisions stress the two, often distinct, aspects of remedies in 
constitutional cases: the reviewing court must invalidate actions or laws it 
finds to be unconstitutional, and it may make any ―just and equitable‖ 
remedial order to the successful party. Both of these elements are important 
for a legal system focused on substantive justice. The mandatory element 
ensures the enforcement of the new constitutional values—and is a 
requirement notably placed on all courts, not just on the Constitutional 
Court. The permissive element allows great latitude for the courts to ensure 
their remedies address more than merely formal equality or negative 
liberties. The breadth of the remedial options means that the courts are free 
to advance genuine fairness and justice in their orders. 
a. Invalidation of Unconstitutional Legislation and Conduct 
A declaration of invalidity is a non-discretionary remedy for the 
reviewing court once it determines the relevant legislation or conduct is 
unconstitutional.49 Such a requirement encourages the reformation of the 
legal system under the new constitutional values. This action is limited only 
by a court‘s capacity to avoid constitutional issues in settling the dispute 
directly before it or to reasonably interpret the provision as consistent with 
the Constitution.50 These elements of judicial restraint have been evident in 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court since its earliest cases.51  
 
 48. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 172(1). 
 49. Id. (1)(a). 
 50. In State v Mhlungu, the court stated, ―as a general principle . . . where it is possible to 
decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which 
should be followed.‖ State v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at para. 59 (S. Afr.); see also State v 
Dlamini 1999 (7) BCLR 771 (CC) at para. 27 (S. Afr.). The Court has held that the doctrine is to be 
observed by lower courts and the Constitutional Court itself. State v Bequinot 1997 (2) SA 887 (CC) 
at para. 14 (S. Afr.). 
 51. Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA at para. 59. 
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b. Just and Equitable Remedial Orders 
In several cases, the Court has declared that, in principle, it has all 
necessary powers to fashion any appropriate remedy.52 In selecting a 
remedy, the requisite balancing will include weighing: (1) the objective of 
the remedy (―to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement‖); (2) the 
value of deterrence of future violations of the right; (3) realistic compliance 
issues; and (4) fairness to all affected.53 South Africa‘s history of human 
rights violations and the practical difficulty of bringing cases to the 
Constitutional Court are presented as justifications for generous remedies in 
human rights cases:  
I have no doubt that this Court has a particular duty to ensure that, 
within the bounds of the Constitution, effective relief be granted 
for any of the rights entrenched in it. In our context an appropriate 
remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective 
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or 
enhanced.54   
The Court‘s judgments often portray its remedial power as the core of 
its constitutional duty. And the Court‘s authority and obligation to produce 
just remedies call upon the justices to seek solutions that reach beyond 
traditional remedies:  
Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief 
may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such 
other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined 
in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is necessary to 
do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure 
the protection and enforcement of these all important rights.55  
In the Njongi case, discussed below, the Court critiques the executive 
 
 52. Hoffmann v S. African Airways 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para. 42 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/17.pdf. 
 53. Id. at para. 45. 
 54. Fose v Minister of Safety and Sec. 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at para. 69 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1997/6.pdf. 
 55. Id. at para. 19; see also Hoffmann, 2000 (1) SA at para. 45 (describing the process for 
fashioning appropriate relief: ―The determination of appropriate relief, therefore, calls for the 
balancing of the various interests that might be affected by the remedy. The balancing process must 
at least be guided by the objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the 
constitutional right; second, to deter future violations; third, to make an order that can be complied 
with; and fourth, of fairness to all those who might be affected by the relief. Invariably, the nature of 
the right infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate 
relief in the particular case.‖). 
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branch officials for failing to consider the ―moral choice‖ related to their 
administrative responsibilities.56 For the Court, decisions about remedies 
seem to involve the moral elements of the judicial role. As Justice O‘Regan 
has stated, ―The power and duty to protect constitutional rights is conferred 
upon the courts and courts should not shrink from that duty.‖57  
Neither the critical importance of the remedial power to the Court nor 
the statements of the Court that it must ―strike effectively‖ at the source of 
the ―constitutional infringement‖ has meant that there are not principled 
limitations on the remedies granted.58 Section 172 has not provided fodder 
for unrestrained generosity on the part of the Court. Most particularly, 
remedies related to state resources have evoked caution from the Court: 
―The court would not lightly make an order the effect of which would be to 
grossly distort the financial affairs of [the state].‖59 The Court occasionally 
appears to be looking over its shoulder at a long line of potential claimants 
to the immediate remedy.60  
The socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the Court has highlighted 
both the expansiveness and the restraint in the Court‘s use of its remedial 
power. In general, the core social welfare rights cases61 affirm that the Court 
 
 56. Njongi v Member of the Executive Council, Dep’t of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (4) SA 
237 (CC) para. 78 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/4.pdf.  
 57. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Another 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 
171 (S. Afr.). 
 58. Fose 1997 (3) SA at para. 96. On occasion, under authority of the Constitution, the Court 
has made exceptions to this rule—or to the normal non-retroactivity of judgments generally—as 
required by interests of justice. The Constitution grants this authority. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, sched. 
6, § 16(6)(a). 
 59. Tsotetsi v Mut. & Fed. Ins. Co. 1997 (1) SA 585 (CC) at para. 9 (S. Afr.). But see State v 
Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at para. 399 (S. Afr.) (―It is only when the interests of good 
government outweigh the interests of the individual litigants that the Court will not grant relief.‖). 
 60. The Court‘s remedial authority also extends to the awarding of costs. Costs will be 
considered cautiously in order to balance promotion of legitimate rights litigation and 
discouragement of frivolous suits. See Motsepe v Comm’r for Inland Revenue 1997 (6) BCLR 692 
(CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.). Notably, the Court has also sought to avoid the ―chilling‖ effect of 
imposing costs against citizen litigants who have sought to uphold their right against the state. 
 61. See, e.g., Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. 
Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1997/17.pdf (discussing right of access to 
health care and emergency medical treatment for terminally ill patient); Government of the Republic 
of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter 
Grootboom], available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.pdf (discussing right of 
access to adequate housing for unlawful squatters); Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter TAC], available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.pdf (discussing health care rights in context of 
mother-to-child HIV transmission). For a discussion of the most judgments (including lower court 
judgments) related to socio-economic rights, see the Socio-Economic Rights Project of the 
Community Law Centre‘s Case Reviews, http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-
projects/socio-economic-rights/case-reviews/south-african-cases/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
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will require implementation that includes ―all reasonable steps that are 
necessary to initiate and sustain‖ a broad, policy-based program to advance 
social welfare with particular attention paid to those who are most 
vulnerable,62 but the ―obligations imposed on the state . . . are dependent 
upon the resources available for such purposes.‖63  
The potential reach of the Court remedies was demonstrated in the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case in 2002. The far-reaching court 
order in TAC required the government to ―devise and implement within its 
available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme‖ to 
address mother-to-child HIV transmission issues.64 It ruled that the program 
must include reasonable measures for counseling and testing pregnant 
women for HIV, must immediately remove the restrictions that prevented 
HIV prevention medication from being distributed widely, and must ―permit 
and facilitate‖ the use of such medication for the purpose of reducing the 
transmission of HIV.65 
The demonstration of restraint has also been evident in the Court‘s 
social welfare cases. Typically, the Court has focused on dissatisfaction 
with governmental programs or governmental action, thereby placing the 
burden on the government to improve its programs, generally without 
reference to the parties who advanced the claims to the Court. The Court‘s 
remedial orders essentially tell the government to do better, rather than 
ensuring any immediate improvement for the complainant.66 Typical of the 
Court‘s remedies is Grootboom, where the Court declared the Western 
Cape‘s housing program unconstitutional but issued an order that brought 
no immediate or direct relief to Irene Grootboom or the hundreds of other 
plaintiffs.67 And, although this remedial modesty in social welfare cases has 
been the basis for significant criticism of the Court, it nevertheless 
highlights the flexible capabilities of the Court‘s remedial authority. 
It is this capacity for expansive remedies, combined with the broad 
discretion to choose an appropriate remedy, that empowers the Court to 
advance substantive justice. These remedial powers, as well as the other 
 
 62. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA at para. 67. 
 63. Soobramoney 1997 (1) SA at para. 11. 
 64. TAC 2002 (5) SA at para. 135. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Christiansen, supra note 4, at 380–84. 
 67. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA at para. 99; see also Kameshni Pillay, Implementing Grootboom: 
Supervision Needed, 3 ESR REV. 11 (2002), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/ 
Kameshni_Pillay_-_Implementing_Grootboom.doc (explaining that, although Grootboom was 
legally significant, its practical effect was limited); Lucie White, African Lawyers Harness Human 
Rights to Face Down Global Poverty, 60 ME. L. REV. 165, 170–71 (2008) (describing Ms. 
Grootboom‘s post-trial frustration). 
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elements of judicial authority and institutional capacity, reflect the unique 
role of the Court within the post-apartheid state and the particular 
constitutional dispensation for the Court—to facilitate the transformation of 
the nation. 
C. Characteristics of the Constitutional Court’s Interpretive Mandate 
Unusually, at least to American commentators, the South African 
Constitution provides substantial guidance in its own interpretation and in 
the interpretation of South African law generally:68   
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom . . . . 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.69   
The ―spirit, purport and objects‖ of the Constitution are identified 
throughout the text. The Preamble asserts that the Constitution is adopted in 
order to ―establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights . . . [and] [i]mprove the quality of life of all 
citizens and free the potential of each person . . . .‖70 Even more pointedly, 
the first section of the Constitution, located in the first chapter (called 
―Founding Provisions‖), states: 
The Republic of South Africa is . . . founded on the following 
values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
 
 68. Famously, the U.S. Constitution provides little guidance beyond what can (sometimes 
controversially) be inferred from the use of broad descriptive language and the Ninth Amendment. 
U.S. CONST., amend. IX (―The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.‖). 
 69. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(2). This replaced a provision in the Interim Constitution 
that explicitly called for ―reading down,‖ a process through which ―a more restricted interpretation 
which does not exceed such [constitutional] limits‖ was applied wherever possible. S. AFR. 
(Interim) CONST. ch. 3, § 35(2). Other references to the role of South Africa‘s constitutional values 
appear in the Constitution, for example, ―[p]ublic administration must be governed by the 
democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution . . . .‖ S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 10, § 
195(1). 
 70. Id. at pmbl. 
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(d) Universal adult suffrage . . . to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.71 
And similarly core guidance is provided in the first section of Chapter 
Two, The Bill of Rights: 
1. This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom. 
2. The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil [sic] the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.72 
These are the constitutional values that animate the post-apartheid 
transformation. The South African Constitutional Court has taken such 
constitutional guidance to heart. From its earliest cases, the Court has 
expressly viewed its interpretive role as ―an approach which, whilst paying 
due regard to the language that has been used, is ‗generous‘ and ‗purposive‘ 
and gives expression to the underlying values of the Constitution.‖73  
To explain the meaning of its interpretive method, the Court has 
frequently cited the famous description of purposive interpretation by Judge 
Brian Dickson (who later became the Chief Justice of Canada) in Regina v. 
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., a case discussing the appropriate interpretation of 
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights.74 Judge Dickson stated that the 
proper meaning of a right is: 
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it 
[is] to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it 
was meant to protect.  
In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of 
the right or freedom in question is to be sought, by reference to the 
character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language 
chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical 
origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the 
meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms 
with which it is associated within the text . . . . The interpretation 
should be . . . a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at 
 
 71. Id. ch. 1, § 1. 
 72. Id. ch. 2, § 7(1)–(2). Also, provincial constitutions and amendments to them ―must 
comply with the values in section 1 and with Chapter 3.‖ Id. ch. 6, § 143(2)(a). 
 73. S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 9 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/ 1995/3.pdf (attributing this understanding to the Canadian 
Charter case Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.)). 
 74. See, e.g., Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA at para. 9; State v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 
(CC) at para. 15 (―This must be right.‖). 
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fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals 
the full benefit of the Charter‘s protection.75 
Such an interpretive method, especially when coupled with the post-
apartheid setting and express transformational values of the South African 
Constitution, grants tremendous discretion and power to the Constitutional 
Court.76 
D. External Authority over the Judiciary 
A final note worth mentioning is that the power of the Court is only 
minimally constrained by external forces. Legally, the Court is working 
from a very clean slate. It is a new institution interpreting a new 
Constitution in a new democracy. Even now, it must reconcile its judgments 
with fewer than fifteen years of precedents. Its frequent reviews of foreign 
and international law77 do little to constrain the outcome of its cases because 
typically the Court reviews similar opinions as support for its conclusions 
and reviews contrary holdings merely to differentiate them from South 
African circumstances.78 
 
 75. Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295, 344 (Can); see, e.g., Makwanyane 
1995 (3) SA at para. 9; State v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at para. 15 (―This must be 
right.‖). 
 76. Complementing this preference for generous interpretation of rights, the desire to advance 
the transformative constitutional values is even present in the guidelines to the Court for when rights 
may appropriately be limited under the Constitution‘s Limitations Clause.  Like many constitutions, 
but notably not the United States Constitution, the South Africa Constitution has a general 
limitations clause that identifies criteria for examining whether a particular violation of an 
enumerated right is nevertheless acceptable under other, broader constitutional principles. The 
South Africa Constitution states: 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including 
a. the nature of the right; 
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c. the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 36. 
 77. Id. § 39(1) (―When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum . . . (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.‖). 
 78. Jolyon Ford, Some Reflections on a Decade of International and Comparative Influence 
on the Rights Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
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Political control over the Court is also extremely limited. The judges 
serve for fixed, non-renewable terms and can be removed only by a 
declaration of ―gross incompetence‖ or ―gross misconduct‖ by the 
politically independent Judicial Service Commission in conjunction with a 
super-majority of the National Assembly.79  Such a procedure seems highly 
unlikely to succeed outside of the gravest of offenses. And indeed no judge 
has been subjected to the Article 177 removal procedure.80 So far, the 
political branches have not become involved in judicial decision-making. 
The Court has been free to set its own limits on its authority—or work 
without them. 
III. RECENT SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE CASES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Study of the textual grant of judicial authority and the pervasiveness of 
enforceable post-apartheid values reveals a powerful and influential court. 
The Constitutional Court has been empowered through its history and its 
governing document to facilitate South Africa‘s transition and 
transformation. First, it was given a unique role in facilitating the transition 
from apartheid to democratic constitutionalism, required to validate its own 
governing document through the certification process, and assigned an on-
going role enforcing the constitutional elements of the negotiations that 
ended apartheid. Second, it was assigned the continuing task of ensuring 
South Africa‘s transformation into a human rights state, which it 
accomplishes through constitutional judicial review over lower court 
decisions and governmental action generally. 
But the institutional capacities of the Court lie dormant until applied in 
real cases. Since its formation in 1995, the Court has decided a host of 
critically important cases related to both social welfare rights and civil and 
political rights.81 Many of these cases have supported the deeper dimensions 
of justice than are typical in legal systems focused exclusively on formal 
equality and negative liberties. This Section highlights three recent cases in 
which the Court has used its unique procedural and interpretive powers to 
facilitate justice in unusual circumstances or through novel means. Each 
case emphasizes several effective means of advancing substantive justice 
 
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 1994–2004, 13–17 (Max du Plessis & Steven Pete, eds., 2004). 
 79. E.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 177(1) (―A judge may be removed from office only if 
―a.  the Judicial Service Commission finds that the judge suffers from an incapacity, is grossly 
incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct; and b.  the National Assembly calls for that judge to 
be removed, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members.‖). 
 80. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE & CONST. DEV., JUDICIAL SERV. COMM‘N ANNUAL REPORTS, 
available at http://www.doj.govza/reports/report_list.html.  
 81. For a detailed discussion of these important cases see Christiansen, supra note 4, at 356–
73.  
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that are available to the Constitutional Court. 
A. Leveraging Parliament to Advance Substantive Equality in Fourie 
In 1994, South Africa became the first country to expressly include 
legal protections for gays and lesbians in its national constitution.82 The 
South African Equality Clause requires ―equal protection and benefit of the 
law‖ including the ―full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms‖ for 
―everyone,‖ and it prohibits governmental and private discrimination 
―directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including . . . 
sexual orientation.‖83 The road to marriage equality for same-sex couples in 
South Africa‘s Fourie case was a direct consequence of these protections,84 
but that case is only one of several equality cases related to sexual 
orientation that the Court has decided. 
 
 82. The historical discussion that follows relies heavily on a longer work. See generally Eric 
C. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet: Sexual Orientation in the South African 
Constitutional Drafting Process, 32 NYU J. INT‘L L. & POL. 997 (2000) (identifying a three-part 
explanation for the South African constitution‘s unprecedented protections for gays and lesbians 
and proposing insights other countries might draw from the experience). 
 83.  Both the Interim Constitution and the final Constitution expressly prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The final Constitution‘s Equality Clause states: 
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. 
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms . . . 
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language, and birth. 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
  5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 9 (emphasis added); S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. ch.3, § 8. 
 84. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Another 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 
76 (S. Afr.). The Equality Clause itself was the culmination of the African National Congress 
(ANC) political ideology of non-racialism. Although many South Africans, including many ANC 
members, opposed the notion that its non-discrimination principles extended to gays and lesbians, 
gay rights groups relied heavily on the ANC during the drafting of the Constitution. Non-racialism 
is a radical view of fundamental human rights and non-discrimination shaped by a history of 
violence-enforced, state-led discrimination in all areas of fundamental human activity for decades. 
CONST. COMM., AFRICAN NAT‘L CONG., A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON STRUCTURES AND 
PRINCIPLES OF A CONSTITUTION FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 13–14 (1991), quoted in Peter 
N. Bouckaert, The Negotiated Revolution:  South Africa’s Transition to a Multi-Racial Democracy, 
33 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 375, 399–400 (1997). 
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1. Gay and Lesbian Equality in the Constitutional Court 
In the 1998 decision of NCGLE v Minister of Justice (NCGLE Sodomy 
case), the South African Constitutional Court decriminalized consensual 
same-sex sexual activity between adult men.85 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Ackermann held that the common law and statutory offenses of sodomy 
violate the equality, dignity, and privacy rights of the South African 
Constitution. Concurring, Justice Albie Sachs stated, ―Although the 
Constitution itself cannot destroy homophobic prejudice it can require the 
elimination of public institutions which are based on and perpetuate such 
prejudice.‖86 
The NCGLE Sodomy case began a trend. Over the next five years, the 
Court handed down four additional rulings related to the rights of lesbians 
and gay men.87 Each was a unanimous decision by the Court; each was a 
victory for the gay plaintiffs; and each reaffirmed the Court‘s fundamental 
commitment to a generous interpretation of the Equality Clause as it applied 
to sexual minorities. In the 1999 NCGLE Immigration case, the Court ruled 
that the equality protections required that a ―partner, in a permanent same-
sex life partnership‖ be entitled to treatment equal to that of a married 
heterosexual spouse for the purposes of immigration law.88 In the 2002 
Satchwell case, the Court held that the government must afford to same-sex 
partners of South African judges the same employment benefits provided to 
opposite-sex spouses.89 In the DuToit case in 2003, the Court ruled that 
denial of second-parent adoption rights to gay couples was a violation of 
their constitutional rights to equality
 
and dignity
 
in addition to being a 
violation of the ―best interests of the child‖ standard required by the child 
 
 85. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. & Another v Minister of Justice & Others 1998 
(1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 106 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NGLE Sodomy], available at http://www. 
saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.pdf. The unanimous decision confirmed a lower court ruling that 
declared unconstitutional the common law offense of sodomy and struck down provisions of the 
Sexual Offences Act that criminalized certain vaguely-defined acts between men. ―A male person 
who commits with another male at a party [―any occasion where more than two persons are 
present‖] any act calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification, shall be 
guilty of an offence.‖ Sexual Offences Act of 1957 s. 20A. 
 86. NCGLE Sodomy 1998 (1) SA at para. 129. 
 87. See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 88. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 
(NCGLE Immigration) 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 57 (S. Afr.), available at http:// www.saflii.org/ 
za/cases/ZACC/1999/17.pdf. 
 89. Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa & Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at 
para. 23 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/18.pdf (―Inasmuch as the 
[Act‘s] provisions in question afford benefits to spouses but not to same-sex partners who have 
established a permanent life relationship similar in other respects to marriage, including accepting 
the duty to support one another, such provisions constitute unfair discrimination.‖). 
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welfare protections of the Constitution.90 And later that year in J and B, the 
Court applied the same reasoning to a case regarding adoption following 
artificial insemination.91 
These judgments evidence the increasing frustration of the Court as a 
result of parliamentary inaction.92 At least since the ruling in NCLGE 
Immigration—if not as far back as the ratification of the Constitution with 
its inclusive Equality Clause—strong evidence existed that the Court would 
rule against sexual orientation-based discrimination in family law generally 
and civil marriage laws specifically. Nevertheless, Parliament had neglected 
to take definitive action on the issue of marriage equality—and required 
additional (and unequivocal) coercion by the Court before it would act. 
In J and B, the Court expressly stated its frustration with Parliament for 
its failure to pass legislation that would bring South African family law into 
compliance with the equality mandate of the Constitution: ―Comprehensive 
legislation regularising relationships between gay and lesbian persons is 
necessary. It is unsatisfactory for the Courts to grant piecemeal relief to 
members of the gay and lesbian community as and when aspects of their 
relationships are found to be prejudiced by unconstitutional 
legislation . . . .‖93 
The Court chided Parliament for its inaction, reminding the members of 
Parliament that they are formally bound by the Constitution94 and that they 
have a constitutional duty to ―respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights.‖95 The executive and legislature were therefore 
―obliged to deal comprehensively and timeously with existing unfair 
discrimination against gays and lesbians.‖96  
2. Marriage Equality in the Constitutional Court 
Marie Adriaana Fourie and her girlfriend Cecelia Bonthuys had been 
together nearly ten years when they brought suit for legal recognition of 
 
 90. Du Toit & Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 
(CC) at paras. 41–43 (S. Afr.). 
 91. J & Another v Dir. Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at para. 
13 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter J and B], available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2003/3.pdf. 
 92. The fact that the government ministers did not actively oppose the gay and lesbian 
applicants in Satchwell, Du Toit, and J and B further suggests that the government did not believe 
there was a viable constitutional argument in opposition to the gay rights claim. 
 93. J and B 2003 (5) SA at para. 23. 
 94. Id.  
 95. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 8(1) (―The Bill of Rights . . . binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state.‖). 
 96. J and B 2003 (5) SA at para. 25. 
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their relationship in the Pretoria High Court in 2002.97 The legal conclusion 
that the rights and privileges of marriage may not be denied on the basis of 
sexual orientation was, in essence, predetermined. Nearly every element of 
the Fourie decision had been previously decided. The Court‘s unanimous 
substantive ruling was a surprise to no one. The prohibition of same-sex 
marriage was unfair discrimination because it was differential legal 
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.98 The Court asserted that the 
gay and lesbian parties to the cases sought:  
the right to be acknowledged as equal and to be embraced with 
dignity by the law . . . [that] accept[s] the reality of their presence, 
and the integrity in its own terms, of their intimate life . . . . [T]he 
law in the past failed to secure for same-sex couples the dignity, 
status, benefits and responsibilities that it accords to heterosexual 
couples.99 
Although the substantive holding was not significantly in doubt, what 
was surprising was the court-ordered delay in enforcing the order of 
invalidity. The Court could have directly and immediately fixed the problem 
it had repeatedly signaled for Parliament to address in previous cases: the 
absence of a comprehensive legal scheme addressing same-sex family 
relationships. In prior cases, it had used its expansive remedial powers to 
invalidate discriminatory laws or to ―read in‖ necessary language to cure a 
constitutional defect.100 The Court took neither option in Fourie. Rather, it 
declared the constitutional infirmity of existing law but held that the ruling 
of invalidity was suspended for one year.101 It sent the deficient law back to 
Parliament and gave it twelve months to ―cure the defect‖ in the Marriage 
Act.102   
 
 97.  Fourie & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Another (Oct. 2002) No. 17280/02 
(unpublished), cited in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 2005 (1) SA 
524 (CC) at para. 7 (S. Afr.). 
 98. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 78–79. (―The common law and section 30(1) of 
the Marriage Act continue to deny to same-sex couples equal protection and benefit of the law . . . 
and taken together result in same-sex couples being subjected to unfair discrimination by the state . . 
.‖). 
 99. Id. at para. 78. 
 100. See, e.g., NCGLE Sodomy, 1998 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 2 (invalidating: ―It is declared that 
section 20A of the Sexual Offenses Act, 1957 is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.‖); 
NCGLE Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 98 (―[S]ection 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 
of 1991, is to be read as though the following words appear . . . .‖). 
 101. Id. at paras. 120–23. 
 102. In justifying its delay, the Court highlighted that much work had been done preparing 
Parliament to make a decision in this area. The Court noted that the South African Law Reform 
Commission was finalizing a legislative report and proposal process that had allowed extensive 
public input, would be imminently available to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
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Parliament was ordered to remedy the discrimination in South African 
family law because the ―present exclusion of same-sex couples from 
enjoying the status and entitlements‖ of marriage is ―unsustainable.‖103 
Same-sex couples may not be ―subjected to marginalization or exclusion by 
law either directly or indirectly.‖104 Parliament must finally perform the task 
the Court had repeatedly reminded them was theirs; as Justice Sachs said in 
relation to the Fourie remedy: ―It‘s not only the court‘s duty to protect 
constitutional rights. In fact, it‘s mainly legislative.‖105 As Parliament 
considered its options, its task was carefully circumscribed by both the 
general ruling in Fourie and the judgment‘s declaration of two mandatory 
―guiding principles‖ relevant to Parliament‘s assigned task.106 
The first principle was that Parliament could not achieve equality by no 
longer recognizing any marriages between opposite-sex or same-sex 
couples. ―Levelling [sic] down so as to deny access to civil marriage to all 
would not promote the achievement of the enjoyment of equality . . . .‖107 
The second principle addressed a concern that the parliamentary response 
would in fact produce ―new forms of marginalization [sic].‖108 The Court 
expressly rejected the apartheid-era legal claim that separate but equal is 
sufficient. ―Ignoring the context, once convenient, is no longer 
permissible . . . .‖ 109 The Court will not be blind to the context in which that 
happens; equality and dignity require a concern for ―the intangibles as well 
as the tangibles involved.‖110   
3. Fourie and Substantive Justice 
The Court‘s insistence on a fully equal solution to the problem of 
marriage discrimination evidenced its generous, purposive interpretation; 
the unanimous ruling leaves little question about the transformative import 
 
Development and through her to Parliament, and that it would be a comprehensive review of the 
necessary legal changes for any formal recognition of same-sex family law arrangements. Fourie 
2005 (1) SA at paras. 130–31. The SALRC in fact noted that the Court ruling would aid it in its 
recommendations to Parliament. Id. at para 129, n.124. 
 103. Id. at para. 147. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Joe Katz, South African Judge Addresses Gay Marriage at Swift Hall, CHI. MAROON 
NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006, available at www.chicagomaroon.com/2006/1/12/south-african-judge-
addresses-gay-marriage-at-swift-hall. 
 106. Fourie 2005 (1) SA at para. 148. 
 107. Id. at para. 149.  
 108. Id.at para. 150. 
 109. Id. at para. 153. 
 110. Id.  
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of the Constitution‘s Equality Clause. And the judgment‘s ―guiding 
principles‖ demonstrate that the reach of equality must be substantive, i.e., it 
must advance more than merely formal or legal equality.111 ―The crucial 
determinant will always be whether human dignity is enhanced or 
diminished and the achievement of equality is promoted or undermined by 
the measure concerned.‖112  
Additionally, the Court‘s decision to assign the task of realizing full 
marriage equality to the Parliament while at the same time narrowly 
circumscribing the result—and even providing a deadline for the 
changes113—demonstrates an expansive and creative use of the Court‘s 
remedial authority to serve transformative constitutional values. The 
expected (and actual) result was that the ANC—the political standard-
bearers of the most notable liberation movement of the last century and the 
overwhelmingly dominant political party in South Africa—passed marriage 
equality into law in South Africa.114   
The ―democratic legitimacy‖ of a legislative resolution,115 the 
requirement of at least legislative support for gay and lesbian South 
Africans from the ANC, and the inevitable discussion of the meaning of gay 
rights in the context of South Africa‘s constitutional values dramatically 
supported the realization of substantive quality both domestically and 
internationally. The use of the Court‘s procedural authority and 
interpretative mandate complemented the content of the ruling itself to 
support the richer, extra-legal dimensions of equality. 
B. Empowering Communities in Olivia Road 
Because of the history of reprehensible use of evictions during 
apartheid, the 1996 Constitution and related statutes create multiple 
protections for even illegal occupiers of land.116 Any eviction, ―a process 
made particularly stressful by historically-created and racially-based 
distortions in relation to access to land,‖117 must comport with Section 25(3) 
 
 111. Id. at para. 152. 
 112. Fourie 2005 (1) SA at para. 153. 
 113. Id. at para. 161 (providing the read–in remedy if Parliament does not act within twelve 
months). 
 114. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). The ANC won 66% of the April 2009 vote. Barry 
Bearak, Final Results Show Resounding Victory for A.N.C. in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2009, at A13.  
 115. Fourie 2005 (1) SA at para. 171 (O‘Regan, J., concurring). 
 116. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 25–26. 
 117. Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty., Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes & Others [2009] ZACC 
16 at para. 337 (Sachs, J., concurring) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/ 
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of the Constitution, the right of access to housing: ―No one may be evicted 
from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.‖118 Statutory protections build upon this 
protection and are bounded by it.119 
1. The Olivia Road Case 
These limits on state action were the subject of the 2008 case, 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg 
(Olivia Road),120 where Johannesburg sought to evict more than 400 
occupants of two inner-city residential buildings due to unsafe and 
unsanitary conditions.121 The city‘s eviction request complied with the 
relevant statutory law,122 and it had acquired an eviction order from the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.123 However, even though Johannesburg had 
satisfied the legal requirements, the Constitutional Court prohibited the 
eviction of the current residents until the two sides to the dispute had come 
together in a process of ―meaningful engagement‖ to discuss how best to 
address the current situation and the difficulties that would arise from the 
evictions.124  
As described by the Court, ―meaningful engagement‖ is a ―two-way 
process‖ through which the government and private parties must ―talk to 
 
cases/ZACC/2009/16.pdf. 
 118. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 26. 
 119. See, e.g., National Housing Code, Housing Act 107 of 1997, s. 4 (S. Afr.); Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (S. Afr.). 
 120. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Twp. and 197 Main St. Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg & Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Olivia Road], available at 
http:// www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/1.pdf.  
 121. Id. at para. 1. 
 122. National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977, s. 12(4)(b) 
(occupational safety standards); Health Act 63 of 1977, s. 20 (hygienic condition standards). 
 123. City of Johannesburg v Rand Prop. (Pty) & Others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) at para. 78 (S. 
Afr.). The eviction order had originally been denied by the Johannesburg High Court for failing to 
address the requirements of those in desperate need. City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) (S. Afr.) (finding that a city housing program failed to comply 
with the constitutional right to housing). 
 124. Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) at para. 13 (―In these circumstances those involved in 
the management of the municipality ought at the very least to have engaged meaningfully with the 
occupiers both individually and collectively.‖); see also id. at paras. 9–23 (―a circumstance that a 
court must take into account to comply with section 26(3) of the Constitution is whether there has 
been meaningful engagement‖ prior to an eviction.);  Id. at para. 18. Notably, arguments for such 
engagement were not raised by the parties at argument or in briefing. Id. at para. 9. 
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each other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives.‖125 Among 
the topics for discussion are the consequences of the government action, the 
means to alleviate any ―dire consequences,‖ and ―when and how the city 
could or would fulfill [its housing-related, constitutional] obligations‖ to the 
residents if they were evicted.126 This requirement is meant to be satisfied 
by pre-litigation127 and should exhibit a ―respectful face-to-face engagement 
or mediation‖ that is a ―pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually 
acceptable solutions.‖128 As described in a later case, engagement is a 
―major pre-condition‖ for eviction, through which the challenge to ―balance 
competing claims is partly resolved by getting the parties themselves to find 
functional solutions according to their respective needs and interests.‖129 
The Court‘s role is merely ―establishing the parameters of what is just and 
equitable.‖130 
For the Court, the engagement requirement announced in Olivia Road 
is an extension of its ruling in Grootboom, the seminal housing rights case, 
that ―[e]very step at every level of government must be consistent with the 
constitutional obligation to take reasonable measures to provide adequate 
housing.‖131 Meaningful engagement is a constitutionally-based requirement 
derived primarily from the interrelated rights to housing and dignity.132 
The City has constitutional obligations towards the occupants of 
Johannesburg. It must provide services to communities in a 
sustainable manner,
 
promote social and economic development,
 
and encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations [sic] in matters of local government. It also has the 
obligation to fulfil [sic] the objectives mentioned in the preamble 
to the Constitution to ―[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens 
and free the potential of each person‖. Most importantly it must 
 
 125. Id. at para. 14. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA at para. 30. 
 128. Id. at para. 12 (citing Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 
(CC) (S. Afr.)). 
 129. Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty., Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes & Others 2009 ZACC 
16 (CC) at para. 338 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/ 
cases/ZACC/2009/16.pdf. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA  at para. 10 (citing Government of the Republic of South Africa 
& Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 82 (S. Afr.)). 
 132. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA at para. 82 (cited in Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA at para. 10) (―The 
Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper if the reasonableness of State action 
concerned with housing is determined without regard to the fundamental constitutional value of 
human dignity.‖).  
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respect, protect, promote and fulfil [sic] the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.133
  
A city that evicts without meaningful engagement ―acts in a manner that is 
broadly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional 
obligations.‖134  
2. Olivia Road and Substantive Justice 
The Olivia Road decision is potentially very significant. It empowers 
affected community members and community-oriented non-governmental 
organizations to affect substantive justice. Compliance with the legal 
requirements for eviction is necessary but not sufficient; the courts will 
enforce a more substantive standard. The ―reasonable measures‖ required by 
the Court‘s purposive reading of the constitutional right of access to 
adequate housing must evidence that the City meaningfully engaged in an 
open and honest, good faith process to anticipate and address the 
consequences of eviction prior to evicting even unlawful residents. 
In this case, as in Fourie, the Court confronted a recalcitrant 
governmental body—a task the Constitution empowered the Court to 
address effectively. It was ―evident during argument that the City had made 
no effort at all to engage the occupiers at any time before proceedings for 
their eviction‖ despite the fact that ―the City must have been aware of the 
possibility, even the probability, that people would become homeless as a 
direct result.‖135  This governmental resistance justifies the placement of the 
burden on the state entity to present a ―complete and accurate account‖ of 
meaningful engagement—in addition to demonstrating satisfaction of all 
statutory requirements—prior to receiving a court order for eviction.136   
In Olivia Road, the Court declared a new, constitutional requirement of 
meaningful engagement of its own authority, supported by the new values to 
the post-apartheid Constitution and the expansive social welfare and dignity 
protections. The Court, confident of its own authority to advance the 
transformative values of the Constitution, established a standard for 
governmental entities that requires them to accommodate those values of the 
Constitution even when acting otherwise in conformity with existing law—
the Court empowers communities and civil society organizations to ensure 
their compliance. 
 
 133. Olivia Road 2008 (3) SA at para. 16 (citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 7(2), 10, 11; 
ch. 7, § 152(1)(b–e)). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at para. 13. 
 136. Id. at para. 21. 
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C. Enforcing Transformational Values in Njongi 
Deliwe Muriel Njongi was an elderly, disabled woman whose only 
source of income since 1989 had been a state social welfare grant.137 In 
1997, the Department of Welfare for the Eastern Cape terminated her 
benefits without notice or explanation.138 She reapplied for the grant and it 
was eventually reinstated in November 2000 with a token retroactive 
payment of R1100.139 The back-pay amount was R15,200 less than what 
was due to her for the period of cancellation.140 More than three years later, 
she initiated suit to regain the deficiency.141 During proceedings, which 
eventually went to the Constitutional Court, the provincial Department of 
Welfare paid her an additional R9400, providing no reason for withholding 
the remaining R5800.142 
1. The Njongi Case 
Rather than being a random, isolated incident, the treatment of Ms. 
Njongi was consistent with a pattern of ―unlawful termination of grants.‖143 
Lower courts had previously acknowledged that the Department of Welfare, 
following a flawed attempt to consolidate multiple grant recipient databases, 
had cancelled thousands of old-age, disability, and child support grants as a 
means to verify beneficiaries and acquire updated information about 
them.144 However, while the underlying, ―unthinkably cruel‖ behavior of the 
Department of Welfare was similar in many cases throughout this period, 
the Court faced a different legal issue in the Njongi case.145 
Because significant time had passed between the resumption of Ms. 
 
 137. Njongi v Member of the Executive Council, Dep’t of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (4) SA 
237 (CC) at paras. 4–5 (S. Afr.). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. In November 2000, when Ms. Njongi‘s benefits were reinstated, one South African rand 
was worth $0.128. At that exchange rate, the full back-pay amount of 16,300 rand was worth 
$2094.58 . See Oanda Currency Converter (rate for November 30, 2000), http://www.oanda.com/ 
convert/classic (last visited July 18, 2009) (for conversion, enter the South African Rand amount of 
―Currency I have‖ and US dollar amount for ―Currency I want‖ for the date of Nov. 30, 2000). 
 143. Njongi 2008 (4) SA at para. 8. 
 144. Id. at para. 9. 
 145. Id. at para. 17 (―[T]he unlawful denial of their grants was unthinkably cruel and utterly at 
odds with the constitutional vision to the achievement of which that Government ought to have been 
committed.‖).  
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Njongi‘s benefits and the present suit, the Department of Welfare asserted 
that the Prescriptions Act, which includes a three-year statute of limitations 
for claims like Ms. Njongi‘s, prohibited her claim.146 As straightforward as 
a statute of limitations claim normally is, the issue was convoluted in 
Njongi.147 Part of the confusion stemmed from the filings of the 
Department, which could, according to the Court, ―generously be described 
as unusual‖ and relied heavily on a High Court case that the Court finds 
inapt.148 
While expressing doubts (but not ultimately deciding) whether claims 
for constitutionally-required social grants could ever be subject to a statute 
of limitations defense,149 the Court concluded that the three-year 
prescription period had not run because, in the absence of a disavowal of the 
precipitating administrative decision, the partial and unexplained payment 
of certain amounts of back-pay was not sufficient to comprise a full 
reinstatement of Ms. Njongi‘s terminated benefits.150 Absent a full 
disavowal or conclusive reinstatement, she would not have known the 
statutory claim period had commenced.151   
However, the willingness of the Court to interpret facts selectively to 
reach the result required by justice is not the most interesting part of the 
opinion for our purposes. Following the core of its rather technical 
judgment, the Court goes on to identify a series of specific faults in the 
underlying administrative action that brought the present case to the 
Constitutional Court.152 This part of the opinion highlights the Court‘s 
critique of the province‘s bureaucratic decision-making and clearly 
identifies areas for future claims that would advance substantive justice.153 
Naturally, there are multiple factors the states must consider when 
 
 146. Act 68 of 1969, s. 12(1) (S. Afr.) (―prescription shall commence to run as soon as the debt 
is due‖). 
 147. Njongi 2008 (4) SA at paras. 28–39. 
 148. Id. at paras. 31–32 (―Not only had the defense of prescription not been raised [in Ntame] 
but the case was unopposed.‖) (citing Ntame v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape, and 
Two Similar cases 2005 (6) SA 248 (E) (S. Afr.)).  
 149. Njongi 2008 (4) SA 237 at para. 42 (S. Afr.) (―I have doubts whether prescription could 
legitimately arise when the debt that is claimed is a social grant; where the obligation in respect of 
which performance is sought is one which the Government is obliged to perform in terms of the 
Constitution; and where the non-performance of the Government represents conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Despite constitutional concerns, I reluctantly conclude that this 
important issue should not be decided in this judgment.‖).  
 150. Id. at paras. 57–58. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at para. 60. 
 153. Id. 
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deciding whether to resist a claim for a rightful make-up payment. 
According to Njongi, one of the most important considerations is ―the moral 
or policy issue whether the Department should use prescription to avoid 
paying disability grant arrears‖ it had incorrectly and unlawfully 
cancelled.154 The Court‘s criticism also stresses that governmental decision 
makers must consider the ―dire inhumane consequences‖155 to the affected 
individual in light of her circumstances. The province‘s failure to comport 
with constitutional values was exacerbated by the lack of evidence that the 
province even took notice of the fact that  
Mrs. Njongi is poor, that she suffers from 100% permanent 
disability, that she has no other source of income and that the aim 
of opposing the application would be to avoid paying disability 
grants that had accrued to her and had not been paid to her as a 
result of [an] unlawful administrative decision.156 
The judgment ends with a strong condemnation of the provincial 
government, which ―failed dismally in its constitutional obligations‖ to 
people in the same situation as Ms. Njongi.157 The Social Welfare 
Minister‘s decision was described as ―unconscionable,‖158 ―grossly 
insulting,‖159 and ―a cynical decision devoid of all humanity.‖160 The Court 
affirmed its own capacity to set aside a minister‘s decision to rely on 
prescription,161 but the judgment focused on the more important point—the 
provincial officials never should have chosen to avail themselves of the 
prescription defense in these circumstances. 
2. Njongi and Substantive Justice 
Writing for the Njongi court, Justice Yacoob stated, ―There is an 
inevitable and, in my view, moral choice to be made in relation to whether a 
debtor should plead prescription particularly when the debt is due and 
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owing.‖162 Consideration of this moral element is a duty that the 
Constitution placed on all state actors. In Ms. Njongi‘s circumstances, some 
of the important considerations were her poverty and vulnerability, her 
disability, and the obligatory nature of the social welfare grant under the 
South African Constitution‘s social welfare provisions.163 Her 
circumstances should have resulted in a decision to not assert the 
government‘s statutory defense because a ―decision by the State whether or 
not to invoke prescription in a particular case must be informed by the 
values of our Constitution.‖164 The Court requires government entities to 
consider whether otherwise legal and neutral decisions are consistent with 
constitutional values.  
A failure to consider—or perhaps to demonstrate such consideration—
would violate the constitutional requirement that the values of the 
Constitution inform all state decision-making. This constitutional mandate 
means that all state administrative decisions are subject to court challenge 
based on their regard for constitutional values, not merely compliance with 
constitutional law. Indeed, the identified values of the Constitution are 
arguably raised to the level of enforceable law by the Njongi case. 
Remedial elements of this case are also important to help ensure future 
compliance by government officials. In Njongi, although the Court 
concludes that there is insufficient basis for a punitive order against the 
Minister for Social Development, the Court‘s due consideration of that 
option is certainly meant as a warning to other governmental officials.165 
Careful and fully informed consideration of any discretionary decision that 
impacts constitutional rights is clearly called for by state officials. All such 
decisions must be informed by the values of the Constitution—equality, 
dignity, and human rights. Moreover, in the area of social welfare rights, the 
state must remember that ―[i]t is the duty of the State to facilitate rather than 
obstruct access to social security. This will be a fundamental consideration 
in making the assessment.‖166 
IV. ADVANCING SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 
In apartheid South Africa, the judiciary was a tool for enforcing the 
Parliamentary-based ideology of racial segregation and oppression.167 In the 
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new South Africa, the judiciary continues to have a critical role in enforcing 
state ideology but, of course, with a radically altered set of values. The post-
apartheid ideology is focused on South Africa as a reformed nation—not 
just a liberal democracy but a human rights state, which is in the process of 
rising to its great potential—to transform itself and be an example to other 
nations.168 The ―new South Africa‖ is not only a result of the struggle 
against apartheid but is also a creation of the Constitution. Hence, the 
Constitutional Court plays the role of chief architect of a ―society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.‖169 
The 1996 Constitution was a reaction against the apartheid ideology 
and the tangible effects of more than forty years of political and socio-
economic discrimination. And, because the injustice of apartheid was 
evidenced in more than formal legal ways, the constitutional response had to 
incorporate broader elements of justice. It would fail to respond fully to 
apartheid—fail its mission of transformative constitutionalism—if the result 
were only formal, legal equality. Hence, the South African Constitution 
goes beyond the standard civil and political rights of formal equality and 
negative liberty. The Constitution conceived of justice in its deeper 
dimensions.  
For the same reason, the Constitution incorporated social welfare rights 
in addition to traditional civil rights. But rights to healthcare, housing, and 
education were not the only constitutional tools to advance substantive 
justice. As discussed in Part II of this Article, the desire for a transformative 
constitutional state also resulted in a particularly potent Constitutional Court 
with expansive procedural authority, an extensive remedial capacity, and a 
value-laden interpretive mandate. The courts were expressly granted the 
power of judicial review over national and provincial action and laws, and 
the Constitutional Court was created as a capstone court over the judiciary 
in order to ensure the transformation of South Africa. 
The cases highlighted above show that the Court is still pursuing justice 
as a central player in the transformative national drama. Furthermore, the 
novel uses of judicial power in the cases discussed here demonstrate a 
potential for social justice that is a hopeful sign for the future of South 
Africa. This hope balances the disappointment of many commentators with 
the limited scope of the Court‘s social welfare jurisprudence. The Court has 
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thought creatively and used its authority expansively to advance fuller, more 
generous notions of justice. I believe this may be a reason for hope that the 
Court will continue to use its authority to advance substantive justice. 
Fourie, Olivia Road, and Njongi illustrate a variety of lessons about 
adjudication for substantive justice. And these judgments are far from the 
only examples in the Court‘s history.170 This Section highlights, in a more 
generalized manner, a few of the more prominent ways in which the Court 
has used its constitutional authority to advance justice. 
A. Calling for State Action 
The first notable general action of the Court is its intentional and 
proactive use of its judgments and judicial orders to steer state actors to act 
consistently with their constitutional obligations. Courts to some element 
always use this guidance function; the nature of legal precedent is intended 
to inform private and state actors of the import of particular legal results for 
relatively similar parties in relatively similar situations. But the South 
African Constitutional Court has gone further.  
The Court has encouraged, or occasionally even chided, the political 
branches into specific action that would advance substantive justice. The 
most obvious example of this occurred in the collection of gay-related 
equality cases that preceded the marriage equality decision in Fourie. The 
Court rebuked Parliament for its failure to pass ―comprehensive legislation‖ 
related to family law and marriage. The consequence was that lesbian and 
gay South Africans had received only ―piecemeal relief‖ in the absence of 
the guidance Parliament had a duty to provide.171 As multiple cases 
highlighted this deficiency between 1999 and 2003, the Court was no longer 
content to imply that Parliament should act. In the last gay rights case before 
Fourie, the Court pointedly declared that ―[i]t is not appropriate for courts 
to determine [details of laws implementing marriage equality] . . . Those are 
matters for the legislature . . . .‖172  
An even more focused version of such direction occurred when the 
court issued its judgment in Fourie and provided ―guiding principles‖ that 
must direct any legislative resolution of unclear family law standards for 
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gay and lesbian couples.173 Even the Court‘s decision to require a legislative 
remedy could be understood to show that Parliament will not escape its 
constitutional responsibilities through judicial resolution. 
B. Commandeering Other Branches of Government 
The ultimate order in the Fourie case, with its delayed judicial 
enforcement ―to allow Parliament to correct the defects‖ in existing family 
law, further demonstrated the Court‘s use of its remedial power to advance 
substantive justice.174 Specifically, the Court‘s order to Parliament, which 
included a one-year deadline and a collection of requirements for the 
eventual legislation,175 leveraged the democratic authority and popularity of 
Parliament generally, and the ANC specifically, and bolstered the Court‘s 
judgment.176 The intended result was substantive equality, i.e., more 
popularly legitimized equality for same-sex couples because it was 
democratically legislated by the politically and culturally dominant ANC. 
Both the Court and Parliament seemed aware of this reason for assigning 
this task to Parliament rather than merely remedying the injustice through 
judicial fiat.177   
The previous gay rights rulings had generally advanced formal equality 
for lesbians and gay men, but the Fourie judgment attempted to accomplish 
more. The marriage equality legislation eventually passed178 could 
consequently claim greater political legitimacy, and the process of its 
passage prompted discussion of gay rights issues popularly. In these ways, 
the Court was able to reinforce the constitutional value of equality in a more 
productive and potentially enduring manner than if it had merely issued the 
ruling itself and ―read in‖ language to alter the existing marriage laws.179 
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The Court instead used its exceptional jurisdictional rules and open-ended 
remedial power to advance substantive equality through a process that 
bolstered the socio-political elements of equality. 
C. Empowering Private Actors 
The Court‘s announcement of a constitutional requirement for 
―meaningful engagement‖180 in Olivia Road also has a potential to support 
substantive justice in a dramatic way. To best advance the underlying 
purpose of the social welfare right of access to housing, the Court 
interpreted it to ensure effective state action to remedy inadequate 
housing.181 Because the Court will require the state to present evidence of 
good faith consultation with impacted individuals and concerned civil 
society organizations prior to evictions, affected communities are 
significantly empowered to advocate for their own rights. Legally permitted 
but fundamentally unfair state action is unlikely where this process has 
occurred. Moreover, the results are far more likely to be acceptable to the 
government and the affected parties and far less likely to be adjudicated 
before the Court. The Court need not adjudicate all such cases directly 
because its permissive access provisions allow it to step in to such disputes 
as necessary.  
Furthermore, since the South African Constitution protects a variety of 
socio-economic rights (in addition to the right to housing that underlies 
Olivia Road), it seems somewhat likely that the Court will require such 
consultation (or some analogous process) when the state makes other 
decisions related to social welfare protections. Such a result would not only 
lead to improved outcomes for community stakeholders but also increase 
popular involvement with government—an oft-mentioned goal of 
Parliament182—and educate the state bureaucracy about ground-level social 
welfare issues. Even if such a constitutional requirement does not spread to 
other categories of socio-economic rights, the occurrence of good faith 
community consultation in one substantive area of social welfare will 
influence popular expectations in other areas. 
D. Policing the Boundaries of Unjust State Action 
The Court sanctions its role as a capstone court supervising the lower 
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judiciary and other brances of government through its generous, purposive 
interpretation of the Preamble, the Bill of Rights, and the multiple 
constitutional commands that all state action should serve the justice-
oriented values of the Constitution. The Court‘s broad jurisdiction and 
access provisions permit the Constitutional Court to ensure that state action 
does not infringe on traditional rights or permit discrimination by law, i.e., 
traditional negative liberties adjudication. However, when the procedural 
authority is paired expansively with social welfare rights or used to require 
value-based decision-making, it serves substantive justice. The Court does 
this most notably and effectively in Njongi.  
The lesson from the Njongi case is that compliance with legal 
requirements is an insufficient justification for otherwise unjust 
administrative action. The obligations to ―[i]mprove the quality of life of all 
citizens and free the potential of each person‖183 as well as to ―respect, 
protect, promote, and fulfil [sic] the rights in the Bill of Rights‖184 create a 
co-existent requirement on state actors. Those constitutional standards must 
inform—sometimes decisively—state decision-making. It is unsafe to rely 
on the assumption that the requisite constitutional standards are 
incorporated into statutory law sufficiently to protect against 
―unconscionable‖ actions. Officials must independently review the impact 
of their decisions against the values of the Constitution. And the Court 
seems ready to enforce such expectations; the Njongi judgment clearly 
implies that the possibility of punitive measures for government officials 
exists and will be considered by the Court.185 Such a threat reinforces the 
need for serious evaluation of the moral dimension of administrative action, 
i.e., the impact of constitutional values. It recruits state actors in the direct 
advancement of substantive justice in their respective areas of 
responsibility. 
E. Reinforcing Fundamental Values. 
One of the Court‘s most enduring tasks in support of substantive justice 
is its constant reiteration of the transformative nature of the South African 
Constitution and of the new values propounded by that Constitution.  
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. 
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great 
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poverty . . . . These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and 
transform our society into one in which there will be human 
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new 
constitutional order.186 
The Court‘s frequent reminders of the fundamentally transformative nature 
of the South African Constitution and the incomplete nature of that 
transformation serve substantive justice in an indirect but important way. To 
the extent that the Court‘s discussion of social welfare rights or of the 
deeper dimensions of equality and dignity encourages popular or legislative 
dialogue about constitutional commitments, it further advances the cause of 
justice reflected in those enumerated rights. This strengthens the role of the 
Constitution in society, reminding all South Africans that the Constitution‘s 
historic promises remain relevant to present problems. It is perhaps a 
particular role of this first generation of the South African Constitutional 
Court to reinforce the values of the Constitution‘s founding generation 
through its written judgments as much as through its specific judicial orders.  
V. CONCLUSION 
―[T]he procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot 
always be separated. The managerial role of the courts may need to find 
expression in innovative ways.‖187  
Generous rights interpretation, expansive remedial power, broad 
jurisdiction, and permissive access rules are the tools of the South African 
Constitutional Court that allow it to serve the transformative goals of the 
post-apartheid Constitution. The Court‘s procedural and interpretive 
characteristics empower it to serve as the pinnacle institution of a country 
committed to transformative constitutionalism and substantive justice. The 
Constitutional Court is, of course, not sufficient for the task of national 
transformation—no court or judicial system could be—but its willingness to 
experiment with its authority is a lesson for all courts.  
What is already evident is that the recent South African cases discussed 
in this Article highlight the opportunities for genuine justice and social 
welfare available to a court that responds creatively to the call for justice 
and employs all of its tools to build a more just society. The South African 
Constitutional Court demonstrates an initial collection of such options in the 
cases discussed in this Article. As the Court uses these tools—in 
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conjunction with its extensive textual protections of civil and political and 
socio-economic rights—it is more empowered than typical national courts 
but it is also more capable of educating other courts of their capacity to 
advance substantive justice in their own countries.  
Further discussions will have to evaluate whether this expanded 
capacity to support genuine justice is exclusively the prerogative of the 
South African courts with their expansive power, but such a conclusion 
seems very unlikely. The more robust application of its own constitutional 
values by the South African Constitutional Court is more easily justified by 
its history and its Constitution, but all constitutions have important, 
fundamental values. And, at least among courts empowered with judicial 
review, some application of the fundamental values that undergird the 
constitution informs all interpretation and application of constitutional 
rights. The results may be less dramatic in less overtly empowered judicial 
systems but the South African Constitutional Court can certainly inspire 
other countries‘ courts (like it does its own lower courts) to explore their 
commitment to their own deepest constitutional values and to substantive 
justice. 
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